The D.C. Circuit releases opinions on Tuesdays and Fridays. We read them all so you don’t have to. On Friday (Dec. 7), the court issued five opinions, and on Tuesday (Dec. 11) the court issued one opinion:
United States v. Durrette. James Durrette was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams of heroin. Durrette appealed his conviction, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed. In an opinion by Judge Henderson (joined by Judges Srinivasan and Edwards), the court reviewed trial testimony from one of Durrette’s co-conspirators in the light most favorable to the government—as is required when reviewing a guilty verdict for sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, the court assessed his co-conspirator’s multiple comments that he gave Durrette either “a hundred kilograms” or”a hundred grams” of heroin. Because any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime—particularly that Durrette had 100 grams of heroin—beyond a reasonable doubt, Judge Edwards affirmed the conviction.
Scahill v. District of Columbia. In 2015, the owners of the Alibi, a restaurant in Northwest D.C.,applied for a liquor license. The D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board was concerned about the involvement of Martin Schahill, who had owned a previous restaurant at the same location and had been fined for allowing underage drinking. The board granted the license with several limitations, including the requirement that the Alibi could not allow Schahill to be on the premises. Schahill and the Alibi’s ownership company challenged the license limitations as violating their First and Fifth Amendment rights. In an opinion by Judge Rogers (joined by Chief Judge Garland and Judge Griffith), the D.C. Circuit rejected the constitutional claims, holding among other things that the license limitations were not unconstitutional conditions.
Matar v. Transportation Security Administration. Nadia Pinkovitsch Matar, a dual citizen ofIsrael and Belgium, was about to board a flight from Canada to the United States when she was advised by a Canadian border official that she was on a United States watch list and should not board the flight. Matar filed a petition with the TSA seeking removal from the list or an explanation for her presence on it. The TSA responded that it would “neither confirm nor deny” any information about Matar’s presence on any watch list. Matar then filed a petition for review at the D.C. Circuit, but in an opinion by Judge Edwards (joined by Judges Henderson and Srinivasan), the court denied the petition because Matar filed it too late. Such petitions, according to the relevant statute, must be filed within 60 days unless there are reasonable grounds for a delay. Matar’s was filed after the deadline, and the court found no reasonable grounds for the delay.
Blanton v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In 2010, William Blanton took the helm of a declining Georgia bank just before it closed its doors. The bank had several issues including a major client who continually over-drafted his 30+ accounts to the tune of $443,532 at one point. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the federal agency tasked with supervising national banks, assessed Blanton a $10,000 penalty related to the overdraft issues as well as a finding that he filed inaccurate reports about the bank’s financial condition, which are required by the National Bank Act. Blanton challenged the penalty and the fact that the comptroller’s decision was considered a “summary disposition,” meaning that it found no genuine issue as to any material fact in its findings—similar to summary judgment in civil litigation. In an opinion by Judge Srinivasan (joined by Judges Tatel and Millett), the court split the baby, affirming the comptroller’s finding regarding the overdrafts but vacating and remanding the question of inaccurate reporting because there appeared to be genuine issues of material fact for the district judge to consider.
Starr International Co. v. United States. Starr International, a Bermuda company that moved to Ireland and then to Switzerland, requested a $38 million tax refund on U.S.-source dividend income under a U.S.-Swiss bilateral tax treaty in 2007. Starr did not automatically qualify for the refund, but the IRS had discretion to award the money. Because the IRS determined that one of Starr’s “principal purposes” in establishing itself in Switzerland was to get tax benefits under the treaty, it denied Starr’s claim. Starr challenged the IRS’s decision, and, at first blush, the district judge dismissed the case as a non-justiciable political question because it would interfere with the executive’s prerogative to consult with the Swiss authorities. The treaty requires a consultation before a refund can be granted. Starr then amended its complaint, arguing that the IRS violated the Administrative Procedure Act. This time the district judge heard the case but sided with the IRS. In an opinion by Judge Edwards (joined by Judges Henderson and Millett), the court reversed the district judge and held that the case did not present a non-justiciable political question. Edwards reasoned that consultation with the Swiss was but one element of the IRS’s deliberative process and that a district court decision would have no impact on the consultation between the U.S. and Swiss authorities. Because Starr was free to proceed with its tax refund claim, the court vacated—with orders to dismiss—the district judge’s decision under the APA because the APA only supports a cause of action when there is no other adequate remedy in a court.
Feld v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. Karen Feld sued her brother, Ken, in 2008 and lost. Ken then sought reimbursement for litigation expenses related to that action from Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company. Ken argued that the FFIC refused to reimburse him the full amount he was due—about $4.5 million—even though FFIC had already reimbursed him for $2.1 million. The district judge sided with FFIC, reasoning that the company paid Ken the amount that had been agreed to. The D.C. Circuit disagreed. In an opinion by Judge Edwards (joined by Chief Judge Garland and Judge Griffith), the court reversed the district judge and remanded the case for trial to determine whether there was in fact an agreement on rates between Ken and the FFIC.
